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Foster Care Privatization: How an
Increasingly Popular Public Policy
Leads to Increased Levels of Abuse
and Neglect
Mandi Eatough

Foster care in the U.S. is largely influenced by federal and state legislation. Since
1996, legislation establishing privatized foster care has become increasingly popular
(Lee 2008). As levels of privatization increase nationwide, it is important to understand the impact this has on the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of children
around the country. The movement toward privatizing foster care is generally attributed to the improvement in economic efficiency of case management by contracted
child placement agencies (Hansen and Hansen 2006). However, the economic benefit
afforded to states by privatizing foster care has been considered independently from
the quality of care received by children in the system by child welfare reports and
scholars alike. Studies relaying failed attempts at foster care privatization, such as
Unruh and Hodgkin's (2004) evaluation of Kansas' failed privatization system in the
early 2000s, regularly refer to economic problems with the specific program. However,
studies such as Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim's (2004) evaluation of privatized foster
care praise economic benefits based on agency placement efficiency as a reason for foster care privatization. These studies do not evaluate the quality of care provided to
children in the system alongside the economic evaluations of the programs.
Since the popularization of privatized foster care in the late 1990s, foster care
advocates have claimed that in contracted child placement situations the quality of
placements are compromised in favor of more efficient placements (Mangold 1999).
However, the research proving or disproving this claim is minimal. Research has
indicated that while foster care privatization efforts have made promises to deliver
a more efficient and effective social care structure, this is not the case. Instead, we
observe increases in system-wide abuse and neglect in foster homes, with the system becoming increasingly irresponsive to the needs of vulnerable children in the
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system (Carey 2008). In 2008, the national advocacy organization Children's Rights
examined privatization efforts in six states: Kansas, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Michigan, and Maine. They found that privatization initiatives in these states did little, if
anything, to increase placement efficiency and found that there were significant gaps
in services provided to children in foster care in crisis (Lustbader 2008).
This research analyzes how changes in legislation related to the privatization
of foster care throughout the U.S. affect the quality of care children in the system
receive as well as how immediately changes in foster care privatization legislation
directly affect the lives of foster children. I have focused this research specifically on
how differences between state foster care privatization levels influence the incidences
of abuse and neglect. Many evaluations of privatized foster care indicate that there
is a potential for privatized foster placement systems to lead to a greater incidence
of unfit placements of children (Chilrnan 1948; Petr and Johnson 1999). However, no
research has focused on a statistical analysis of the relationship between levels of
privatization and unfit placements. It is vitally important that legislators understand
the effects foster care privatization has on the lives of hundreds of thousands of children throughout the United States. Because of foster care reporting laws enacted in
the early 1990s as part of the Social Security Act of 1994, data is available to determine
whether or not foster care privatization is leading to increases in the incidence of
abuse and neglect. The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System
(AFCARS) collects information on all foster care placements and adoptions within
the U.S. through the Administration for Children and Families (Children's Bureau
2012a). It is not enough to discuss these consequences theoretically when the information necessary to evaluate these policies is available to analyze the issue further.

Data
Since 1994, Section 479 of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act has required that all
agencies handling foster care or adoptions through the state report detailed information about foster care and adoptive placements (Children's Bureau 2012b). This data,
as collected by AFCARS, is the most comprehensive set of information about children
in foster care in the United States. These datasets include information on all children in foster care each year in fifty-two locations: the fifty states as well as Puerto
Rico and the District of Columbia (all of which are further referred to as states). The
AFCARS datasets include placement and removal information for every child as well
as demographic information about each of the children. Because of safety concerns
for children in the foster care system, the AFCARS datasets are only available to
investigators for the purposes of statistical research and reporting (NDACAN 2016b ).
Theoretical Framework
The privatization of government services has been largely attributed to the efficiency and economic benefits these privatizations have provided in the past (Duggan
2004). However, scholars studying privatization of government programs have dis52
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covered that this behavior often leads to accountability problems within bureaucratic
systems. In a 2011 study of practices in privatized foster care agencies, it was determined that market-based competition caused by foster care privatization produced
shifts in foster care policies. While this is not inherently an issue, a major concern
outlined in this study was the potential for creating programs that affect vulnerable
populations that cut costs by cutting corners. Based on this study, the vulnerability
of children in the foster care system outweighs the potential for cost benefits coming
from privatization in favor of stronger levels of accountability within the foster care
system (Bouche and Volden 2011). Unfortunately, the ideals outlined in this study do
not represent reality.
Privatized foster care in the U.S. is favored by legislators because of its economic
and service efficiency (Mangold 1999). However, differences between the care children
receive in privatized and non-privatized placement systems are rarely considered
when legislative decisions are being made. In a survey of 150 foster care social workers in the Midwest, it was found that there are significant differences between workers
at privatized and non-privatized agencies. Social workers working in non-privatized
agencies were found to value emotionally supportive parenting and sociocultural
influences on child welfare as important when making case decisions almost twice as
much as their privatized counterparts. Workers at privatized agencies valued placement efficiency and received higher salaries than their non-privatized counterparts
for similar hours of work (Hollingsworth et al. 2010). These differences in the attitudes of social workers when considering placements directly influence the quality
and type of placement children placed through their agency receive.
A qualitative study conducted by Humphery, Turnbull, and Turnbull (2006)
examined the perceptions of privatized foster care among foster parents, foster service providers, and judges in Kansas (the first state to fully privatize foster care).
Many participants indicated that they believed the privatization of foster care directly
led to less appropriate placements for children in the system. One foster care service
provider indicated they observed that children were being placed in foster homes
more quickly than they had been before privatization, but those homes were often
unfit for the children who were placed. Another foster care service provider explained
that they believed that the caseload levels at privatized foster care agencies are too
high. They claimed that these high caseloads for workers promoted faster placements
with lower levels of scrutiny. Another case worker indicated that they believed their
agency valued efficient and inexpensive placement of children in their cases.
Given this theoretical framework surrounding foster care privatization, I hypothesize that privatized foster care placement agencies will favor less expensive case
goals such as a reunion with parents, placements with other relatives, or emancipation over more expensive case goals such as adoption or long-term foster care. For
reference, adoptions from foster care generally cost the government between $1,000
and $5,000 and the cost per child in foster care is between $7,000 and $10,000 per year.
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Both of these costs vary by state (Fixsen 2011). Comparatively, a reunion with parents
or placements with other relatives are essentially free for the government.
Several studies have shown that even when information is collected about the
satisfaction of foster children and foster parents about placement systems, the input
from these groups is rarely considered when making claims about the effectiveness of
foster care privatization. As early as the 1970s, researchers have been acknowledging
the importance of child and parental satisfaction measurements in determining foster
care legislation. Bush, Gordon, and LeBailly (1977) expressed concerns that the measurements being used to determine the effectiveness of foster care did not consider
the satisfaction of the children receiving the service. They found that foster children
largely expressed concerns about being placed in homes where they felt they were not
wanted. Kapp and Propp (2002) argued that the viewpoints of parents with children
in foster care are regularly ignored when considering successes in foster care legislation. Tilbury, Osmond, and Crawford (2010) examined efforts made to understand the
perspectives of children in welfare services. They claim that an effort to understand
these perspectives is one of the most important tools child welfare service providers
have to improve their work.
In fully privatized systems, all children are placed by contracted child placement
agencies. However, many states have partially privatized systems, which means that
children in the same state, or even county, will be placed by both privatized and nonprivatized agencies. Which agency a child's case is handled by should be based on
agent proximity and availability at the time a child enters the system ("Foster'' 2016).
However, it would be reasonable to question if, in partially privatized systems, more
difficult cases are given to one type of agency, because they are better fit to handle the
case. Proponents of privatization claim that privatized placement agencies handle
even the most difficult foster care cases more efficiently (Carey 2008). It has also been
shown at length that children with behavioral problems are more susceptible to abuse
within the foster care system (Goldman 2003). If difficult cases are more likely to be
placed with privatized agencies, there is a concern that the privatization of placements is subject to selection bias where children more likely to experience neglect or
abuse are handled by privatized agencies when available. To ensure that the results
of these analyses are not based on this selection bias, I have compared the proportion of difficult cases seen in both privatized and non-privatized placements. Difficult
cases may be indicated by a total number of home removals greater than the national
average of three or listed home removal reasons related to a child's behavior. The
proportion of cases with these indicators are shown in Table 1.
The largest difference in these indicators is the proportion of children who have
more than three total home removals, where non-privatized placements see this in
25.08 percent of cases and privatized placements see this in 19.78 percent of cases.
Because we actually see a smaller proportion of privatized placements involving difficult cases, this selection bias, if it exists, is likely to go to the opposite way than
54
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theorized, with problem cases being assigned to non-privatized placement agencies
in partially privatized systems. This means if this selection bias exists the results of
this analysis are weakened by the bias, meaning there is no concern for interference.

Table 1. Distribution of Difficult Cases and Placement Type
Difficult Case Indicator

Non-Privatized

Placements
Total Number of Removals Greater Than 3 25.08%
Child Removal for Child's Behavior
15.81%
Child Removal for Child's Alcohol Use
1.06%
Child Removal for Child's Drug Use
2.99%

Privatized Place-

Difference

ments
19.78%
14.49%
1.07%
3.54%

-5.3%
-1.4%
0.01%
0.55%

This research is based heavily in the theoretical increase in unfit foster care
placements when a state privatizes its foster care system. This theory considers the
favorability of low cost placements by privatized foster care placement agencies to
be a significant disadvantage to children in foster care. I will consider three effects of
privatization on the quality of care received by foster children: 1) how privatization
affects the goals of child placements within the system, 2) how increases in foster
care privatization affect the risk of abuse and neglect of children in the system, and
3) how immediately changes in foster care legislation begin to affect the type and quality of placements in the system. To evaluate these effects, this study consists of three
hypotheses related to foster care privatization and the quality of placements foster
children receive while in the system:
1) Privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements efficient and less costly.
2) Increased levels of privatization will lead to an increase of unfit placements in
the form of an increased risk of abuse and neglect for children in that system.
3) Changes in foster care legislation will have an immediate effect on the privatization level and quality of placements received by children in the foster
care system.
In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, three analyses have been conducted using the AFCARS datasets. The first analysis is a set of multinomial logistic models of both placement case goals and system removals based on whether or
not the placement was privatized. This analysis aims to support the hypothesis that
privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements efficient
and less costly. The second analysis is a set of proportional hazard models depicting
the risk of abuse and neglect in foster homes over time based on level of privatization
in a foster care system. This analysis aims to support the hypothesis that increased
levels of privatization will lead to an increase of unfit placements in the form of an
increased risk of abuse and neglect for children in that system. The final analysis is a
set of time series models for each state based on levels of privatization and abuse incl-
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dence. In this final analysis, foster care privatization policy information was collected
from the Reason Foundations' annual privatization reports to allow for a testing of
potential breaks in the time series models based on foster care privatization legislation("Annual" 2016).
While the three analyses are different in what is being studied, some discussions
related to potential controls and biases hold across each analysis. The AFCARS dataset
provides some demographic information about children in foster care, but the majority
of the information is focused on the child's placement or removal from a foster home.
The three major demographic covariates in the dataset were indicative of gender, race,
and age. To determine if these demographic factors appear to impact the probability of an unfit placement, based on whether a child was removed for either abuse or
neglect, a simple logistic regression was run (results shown in Appendix, Table 1).
While there were slight changes in the probability of a child being placed in an unfit
home, the changes were not substantive enough to indicate a real-world change. 1

Analysis 1: Placement Case Goals and System Removals Based on
Privatization
Theory suggests that contracted child placement agencies are more likely to
favor placements that cost less and are more efficient. I consider the case goals of child
placements between 2000 and 2014 to analyze the type of placements favored by both
privatized and non-privatized placement agencies. The AFCARS dataset includes a
variable indicating the case goal of a child for each of their placements. A case goal is
indicative of how the placement agency believes the child will be removed from the
foster care system. This variable indicates one of seven goals: reunion with parents,
placement with other relatives, adoption, long-term foster care, emancipation, guardianship to a non-relative, or no case goal.
To begin this analysis, foster care case goals for more than fourteen million child
placements between 2000 and 2014 were broken down based on whether the placements were privatized, as seen in Figure 1. In this raw data break down, each 1 percent change in the distribution of case goals is representative of a change of more
than 15,000 case goals. While it appears that the relative frequency of case goals is
similar between privatized and non-privatized foster care placements, the distribution indicates two major shifts. The first shift is a 4 percent decrease in adoptive case
goals from 23 percent to 19 percent when moving from non-privatized to privatized
placements. The second shift is a 5 percent increase in a case having no case goal
from 8 percent to 13 percent. The decrease in adoption case goals among privatized
placements supports the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies will disfavor
more expensive case goals. However, the increase in the number of placements without case goals does not. Children in the foster care system without a case goal are
essentially trapped in the system until they are given a means of exiting the system.
As discussed later in this research, the longer children remain within the system, the
greater their risk for abuse and neglect becomes.
56

EA10UGH

Figure 1. Case Goals for Foster Care Placements by Privatization
Privatized Placements

on-Privatized Placements
8%

• Reuni1e With Parent
• Li\'C With Relative
• Adop1ion

48%

48%

• Long• Term Foster Care
• Emancipation
Guardianship

No Case Goal

5%

Because the number of privatized and non-privatized placements are not equal,
these direct case goal distribution comparisons indicate but do not prove an actual
difference in the probability of any given case goal. To more accurately determine
these differences, a multinomial logistic regression model was used to calculate the
odds of a child having each case goal based on whether the placement was privatized or not, as seen in Table 2. The base case goal used in this model is a reunion
with parents, because this is the most common case goal for both privatized and nonprivatized placements.
Based on the theoretical hypothesis, there is an expectation of an increase in
the odds of less expensive placements, such as a placement with other relatives or
emancipation, and a decrease in the odds of more expensive placement options,
such as adoption or long-term foster care. This model confirms this hypothesis.
Considering less expensive case goal options, when a case is privatized, the odds
a placement will have a case goal of placement with other relatives is increased

Table 2. Odds for Case Goals by Placement Type
Case Goals

Chan2e in Odds When Privatized

Live with Other Relatives

24.97%
(0.0040)
-19.19%
(0.0014)
-20.10%
(0.0023)
12.44%
(0.0032)
-12.86%
(0.0031)
62.71 %
(0.0036)

Adaption
Long-Term Foster Care
Emancipation
Guardianship
No Case Goal

Standard Errors in Parentheses I All results from this model are statistically significant at the
99% level.
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by nearly 25 percent, and the odds a placement will have a case goal of emancipation is increased by over 12 percent. This indicates an increase in the favor of less
expensive case goals by privatized placement agencies when compared to those of
non-privatized placements.
Considering the more costly case goal options, when a case is privatized, the
odds of a placement having a case goal of adoption decrease by over 19 percent,
and the odds of a placement having a case goal of long-term foster care decrease
by over 20 percent. This indicates a decrease in the favor of expensive case goals by
privatized placement agencies when compared to non-privatized placements. In
addition to our hypothesis-based analysis, we again see that foster child placements
with no case goals experience a drastic increase when in privatized systems, with
the odds of a child not having a case goal having increased by more than 62 percent.
This indicates that there is a significant concern that children in privatized placements have no way of getting out of the system. While the increase in placements
without case goals goes against the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies
prefer case goals that lead to non-costly exits from the system in a timely manner,
it suggests that children in privatized placement systems are more likely to become
trapped in the system.
While case goals are hypothetically indicative of actual removals from the system,
they are not equivalent to actual case outcomes. To determine if case goals are actually
representative of the way children in privatized and non-privatized placements leave
the foster care system, I have specifically examined the discharges of children from the
foster care system. The AFCARS datasets provide information about each discharge
from the system as a variable coded to represent one of eight discharge types: reunion
with parents, placement with other relatives, adoption, emancipation, guardianship to
a non-relative, transfer to another agency, child runaway, and the death of a child. The
raw data distribution based on privatization can be seen in Figure 2.
When comparing the raw data distribution of actual placement outcomes, represented in this research by discharges from the system, we see that there appear to
be significant decreases in the percentage of children in privatized placements that
are adopted and emancipated compared to the percentage of children with these case
goals in privatized placements. We also see that there appears to be an increase in
the percentage of children who are placed with relatives or have a non-relative given
guardianship when compared to the percentage of children with these case goals
in privatized placements. These increases in non-costly placement outcomes seen in
privatized placements compared to non-privatized placements support the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements
efficient and less costly.
As was true with the case goal analysis, the number of children in non-privatized
and privatized placements who are discharged from the foster care system are
unequal. This means it cannot be claimed that these direct system discharge distribu-
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Figure 2. Discharges from Foster Care by Privatization
REA SONS FO R DIS C H A RGE FROM FOSTER CARE
(PE RCE NTAGES)
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tion comparisons show an actual difference in the probability of any given type of
system discharge. The number of children removed from the system is not equivalent
to the number of children in the system, meaning that some children are unrepresented in the system discharge data, making direct distribution comparisons between
case goal and system discharge distributions even more unreliable. To determine
these differences more accurately, a multinomial logistic regression model was used
to calculate the relative risk ratios of system discharges based on whether the placement was privatized or not, as seen in Table 3. The base discharge type used in this
model is a reunion with parents because this is the most common type of discharge
for both privatized and non-privatized placements. In addition to the relative risks,
Table 3 also includes a percentage change indicating the similarity between the odds
of discharge types and the case goals that directly correlate with four of the discharge
types. This percentage change is representative of the relationship between a child's
privatized placement having one of these four case goals and that child being discharged with that case goal.

Table 3. Relative Risks for System Discharge by Placement Type
Chanste in Odds
Relation to Case Goals
30.75%
5.78%
-36.00%
-16.81%
-16.15%
-28.59%
-2.99%
9.87%
0.93%**
N/A
35.02%
N/A
0.36%**
NIA
**Not Statistically Significant I All Other results from this model are statistically significant at
Dischare:e TvPe

Live with Other Relatives
Adovtion
Emancivation
Guardianshiv
Transfer to Another Ai>encv
Runawav
Death of Child

the 99% level.
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Based on the theoretical hypothesis and the results of the analysis of case goals,
we expect to see a decrease in system discharges that cost more, such as adoption,
and an increase in system discharges that are less expensive, such as placements with
other relatives or emancipation. Looking at adoption, we see that there is a significant
decrease in the odds of a child in privatized placement being adopted, with the
odds decreasing by 36 percent compared to children in non-privatized placements.
When this is compared to the odds of adoption being a case goal, we see more than
a 16 percent decrease in the actual odds of adoption from privatized placements
when compared to the odds of privatized placements listing adoption as a case goal.
Children in privatized placements have increased odds of being placed with relatives other than their parents. The odds of a child in privatized placement being discharged from the system to a placement with a relative are 30 percent greater than
for children in non-privatized placements, a 5 percent increase when compared to the
odds of placement with a relative being the case goal of a child in a privatized placement. There is an increase in the likelihood that a child in a privatized placement has
guardianship given to a non-relative. There is nearly a 10 percent increase in the odds
of a non-relative receiving guardianship being the actual discharge type of a privatized placement compared to the odds of a privatized placement listing this as a
case goal. These results confirm the hypothesis that privatized placement companies
prefer less costly system discharges.
By specifically analyzing discharges from the foster care system, we see there is
a 35 percent increase in the odds of a child in a privatized placement running away
than a child in a non-privatized placement. According to studies of foster care runaways, the majority of children who run from a foster home run because of an unfit
placement situation combined with a distrust in the foster care system. This distrust
is often caused by a continuous pattern of unfit placements (Nesmith 2006). The
increase in runaways seen in privatized placements supports the second hypothesis
of this study: privatized placements lead to increased levels of abuse and neglect.
Given this analysis, we see that children in privatized placement systems
are less likely to have case goals and system discharges that cost more and that
privatized placements are more likely to put children in homes without a welldeveloped case plan. Proponents of privatization efforts have often claimed that
the goal of privatization is to increase adoption rates (Hansen and Hansen 2006).
This analysis indicates that the results of privatization are the opposite. Children
in privatized placements are significantly less likely to have case goals of adoption and are even less likely to actually be adopted. We also saw that children in
privatized placements have an increased risk of being runaways, something that
is associated with unfit placements. Whether privatization actually increases the
likelihood of a child being placed in an unfit home is unclear based on this analysis. The next section examines the relationship between privatization and levels of
abuse and neglect.
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Analysis 2: Risk Levels of Abuse and Neglect Based on Privatization
To begin this analysis, the incidence of abuse and neglect for more than fourteen
million child placements between 2000 and 2014 were broken down into four groups:
neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and abandonment. This breakdown was based
on whether the placements were privatized as seen in Figure 3 (an extended version
of this graph including additional abuse and neglect covariates is available in the
Appendix, Figure 2). Physical and sexual abuse are representative of abuse incidence,
while neglect and abandonment are representative of neglect incidence. As with the
raw data breakdowns in the first analysis, each one percent change in incidence of
abuse or neglect is representative of a change of over 15,000 cases. This breakdown
shows that for the four basic categories of neglect and abuse, the percentage of removals attributed to these factors appear to be similar regardless of placement privatization, with the largest difference being a 4.36 percent greater incidence of physical
abuse in privatized placements than in non-privatized placements. However, because
of the significance of even a 1 percent difference in abuse incidence, this data indicates
that for each of the four groups, abuse and neglect have a higher incidence rate in
privatized placements than in non-privatized placements.

Figure 3. Incidence of Abuse and Neglect by Privatization
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Existing theory suggests that the likelihood of abuse and neglect in foster homes
increases the longer a child has been in the system (Goldman et al. 2003). In order to
calculate the differences in the risk of abuse and neglect over time given three levels
of privatization, I used a series of proportional hazard models focused around the
risks of the four grouped incidences of abuse and neglect. The three levels of privatization are based on the Alliance for Children and Families' definition of foster care
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privatization levels, where a system with at least 25 percent privatized placements
is considered small-scale privatization, a system with at least SO percent privatized
placements is considered large-scale privatization, and a system with 1()() percent
privatized placements is full system privatization Gones 2011). 2 The annual risk
changes based on level of privatization of each of these models can be seen in Table 4
(an extended version of this table including additional abuse and neglect models as
well as the hazard ratios of each model can be found in the Appendix, Table 2).

Table 4. Annual Risk Changes in Abuse and Neglect by Privatization
Model

Risk Change for SmallScale Privatization

Risk Change for LargeScale Privatization

Risk Change for Full
System Privatization

Physical Abuse

.24%

.48%

.97%

Sexual Abuse

.16%

.33%

.66%

Neglect

.23%

.47%

.95%

Abandonment

.25%

.51%

1.01%

All results are statistically significant at the 99% Level.

The results of the proportional hazards models indicate that risk increases over
time for all four covariates and that increases in the level of privatization also lead
to increases in the risk of abuse and neglect. While these risk changes may seem
insignificant, when they are considered over the potential eighteen years a child may
spend in foster care, the increases in risk become more substantial. Figure 5 shows
the cumulative hazards of physical abuse and sexual abuse, while Figure 6 shows the
cumulative hazards of neglect and abandonment, both for foster care children based
on the system of privatization in their state. Cumulative hazards are indicative of the
risk of an event occurring given that it has not happened yet (cumulative hazards
for additional abuse and neglect covariates are available in the Appendix, Figure 2).
Because the average time a child spends in foster care is two years and the longest
period of time a child spends in foster care is eighteen years, my analysis will focus
on these two periods.

Abuse
When considering physical abuse, we see that at two years in foster care the
increase in risk of physical abuse between a child in a state with no privatization and
a state with system-wide privatization is about 20 percent. When comparing children
in foster care their entire lives, a child in a state with system-wide privatization has
a risk of physical abuse that is about SO percent greater than a child in a state with
no privatization. When considering sexual abuse, after two years in foster care the
increased risk of sexual abuse in a state with system-wide privatization compared to
a state with no privatization is about a 0.5 percent increase, but when considering an
eighteen-year period in foster care, the risk increases by about 10 percent. Because the
incidence of physical abuse in the foster care system as a whole is much greater than
62
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Figure 5. Cumulative Hazards of Physical and Sexual Abuse
Risk of Phy~ical Abuse Over Time
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Figure 6. Cumulative Hazards of Neglect and Abandonment
Risk of Neglect Over Trme
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the incidence of sexual abuse, it is expected that the general risk and increased risks
of physical abuse are much larger than those of sexual abuse.

Neglect
When considering neglect, we see that after two years in foster care the majority
of children will have been removed from at least one foster home for neglect, regardless of whether the system is privatized or not. However, at eighteen years in the
system, we see that instances of neglect will likely increase from three to four when
comparing children in non-privatized and fully privatized systems. When considering abandonment, we see that at two years in foster care the difference in the risk of
abandonment between a child in a state with system-wide privatization and a state
with no privatization is about a 0.7 percent increase. At eighteen years, this difference increases significantly to a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of abandonment.
Looking back at the neglect proportional hazards model in Figure 6, we see that the
risk of neglect in the system is generally high. Neglect is generally used in foster care
placement removal reporting as a catch-all term for any form of neglectful or abusive situation that cannot be explained by a more specific form of neglect or abuse.
Because of this, neglect is the most commonly listed reason for a removal from a foster care placement. Alternatively, the risk of abandonment is generally low and is the
least commonly listed reason for removal from a foster care placement.
In each of these proportional hazards models, it was found that children in privatized systems experience higher risks of all abusive and neglectful placement situations and that these risks increase for all children over time regardless of level of
privatization. This analysis confirms existing qualitative analyses of foster care privatization, which indicate that the emphasis privatized foster care placement agencies
put on efficiency within the system compromises the quality of placements children
in privatized systems receive.

Analysis 3: Actual Changes Caused by Public Policy
In my first and second analyses, I have shown that foster care privatization
directly influences the type and quality of placements within the foster care system.
Foster care privatization, regardless of the level, is generally enacted through state
legislation. These legislations provide guidelines for the implementation of foster care
privatization over both short term (1-2 year) and long term (3--5 year) time periods.
To determine if privatization legislation has an immediate effect on the levels
of privatization and incidence of abuse within the state, I used eighty-six individual
time-series models-two for each state with a change in privatization through legislation 2000-14.
These models were used to determine if the year the privatization legislation was
enacted showed a break in privatization or abuse incidence. If we see a break in either
privatization or abuse incidence at the time the legislation was passed, we assume
that there was an immediate effect in the foster care system based on the legislation.
65

SIGMA

Figure 7. Observed Immediate Changes in Foster Care Privatization
and Abuse Incidence Based on Privatization Policies
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When we see breaks in both privatization and abuse incidence, we assume that the
immediate effect in the system was more significant than those with just one break.
Figure 7 shows whether each state experienced an immediate effect, in the form of
a break, from a change in foster care privatization legislation, and if so which effect
was observed. In nine states (Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) there was no privatization
legislation passed within the period being studied. In twenty-four of the remaining
forty-thee states the privatization legislation appeared to have no immediate effect on
privatization or abuse incidence, leaving nineteen states with an apparent immediate
effect on the foster care system.
The states with breaks in the time series models indicating an immediate shift in
privatization levels are California, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of Columbia,
Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.
The states with breaks in the time series models indicating an immediate shift in
abuse incidence are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vrrginia. The five states with breaks in
both privatization and abuse incidence are Connecticut, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Vrrginia.
The plots of the time series models for the five states with both privatization and
abuse incidence breaks are visualized in Figure 8. It appears that the shifts caused by
breaks in privatization are much larger than the shifts seen at breaks in abuse inci66
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dence. In three of these states, Connecticut, Delaware, and Texas, there is an immediate decrease in the level of privatization, while in Oklahoma and Virginia there is
an immediate increase in the level of privatization. The changes in abuse incidence,
while difficult to see, follow the direction of the increase or decrease in privatization.
This correlation relationship further supports the theory that privatization legislation
leads to changes in the incidence of abuse.

Figure 8. Time Series Plots and Breaks
Changes in Privatization and Abuse Over Tune
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Given that in about half of the states where foster care privatization legislation
was passed between 2000 and 2014 there was an immediate break in either levels of
privatization or the incidence of abuse within the state, we can verify the hypothesis that foster care legislation directly influences the lives of children in the foster
care system. It is highly unlikely that in nineteen individual observations in different
states and in different years there would be a structural break in privatization and
abuse that was unrelated to the corresponding changes in foster care policies in the
states. Each time a state's foster care legislation is changed, it has the potential to
immediately affect the lives of thousands of foster children.

Discussion
Through three separate analyses, this paper has shown that the privatization of
foster care directly affects the type and quality of care children in the foster care system receive. All three of the expected outcomes based on current qualitative theory
surrounding foster care privatization were verified in this research.
In the first analysis, it was shown that privatized placement agencies favor case
goals that make placements efficient and less expensive. Most notably, a significant
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decrease is seen in the probability of a child being adopted from a privatized foster care
placement when compared to placements by non-privatized agencies. lhe first analysis
also indicated that children placed by privatized foster care agencies are more likely to
be placed without a specific case goal. When children are placed without a case goal,
the agency has no plan in place for a removal from the system, increasing the length of
time children spend in the system. As seen in the second analysis, the longer children
remain in foster care, the greater their risk of being placed in abusive homes.
lhe second analysis showed that increased levels of privatization lead to an
increase of unfit placements in the form of an increased risk of abuse and neglect of
children. Significant differences are seen between the risks of abuse and neglect the
longer children have been in the foster care system, with the greatest differences seen
when children remain in the system for eighteen years.
lhe third analysis showed that changes in foster care legislation have the potential to cause an immediate effect on the privatization level and quality of placements
received by children in the foster care system. Privatization legislation did not indicate an immediate change in the privatization level or incidence of abuse in every
state. However, the immediate changes seen in half the states with major privatization legislation changes indicate that privatization legislation does have a direct and
immediate influence on the lives of children in the foster care system.
It is important to realize the limitations of this analysis. While the AFCARS datasets provide information for all foster children in every state within the system each
year, the identification information for each of these children is fairly limited. lhis
demographic information is limited to basic differences, such as race, gender, and
age. Existing theories about foster care abuse suggest that the economic situation a
child lived in prior to their entry into the foster care system, as well as the economic
situation of a foster family, may indicate the likelihood of a child exiting the system
quickly. Poorer children are staying in the system for significantly longer periods
of time than children from affluent families. Children placed with poorer families
are also staying in the system for longer periods but in the poor home for a shorter
period (Hansen and Hansen 2006). As shown in the second analysis, the longer a
child remains in the system, the greater their risk of abuse and neglect becomes. These
analyses could be improved with an inclusion of economic information about children pre- and post-placement.

Conclusions
lhis research shows the significant negative influence an increasingly popular
form of public policy has on the lives of children within the foster care system. Legislators, social workers, and citizens alike should consider the findings of this research
as a substantial sign that foster care privatization, as it currently functions in the U.S.,
should not be the standard for which we strive. In 2015, more than 650,000 children
spent time in foster care. With the number of children in foster care on the rise, it is
important that we consider the real-world impact that this study represents (AFCARS
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2015). The increases in the risk of abuse and neglect when privatized child placement
agencies are placing children as shown in this research are based on real levels of
abuse and neglect within the U.S. foster care system for fourteen years.
This research also has significant implications on research about adoption
within the United States. Adoption is often considered the best-case scenario for
children in the foster care system in the U.S. who have no possibility of returning to
their biological parents (Cowan 2004). In an analysis of several studies regarding
the benefits of adoption for children in foster care, it was found that children who
are adopted ultimately have better outcomes than those who remain in the system or
those who are returned to their biological parents. This is believed to be because of
the positive influence adoption has on the enhancement of the emotional and intellectual potential of children (Hoksbergen 1999). Those involved in the promotion
of adoption both within and outside of the U.S. foster care system may benefit from
understanding the significant differences seen in this paper between privatized and
non-privatized child placements.
I hope this analysis may be used as a stepping stone for additional research of the
effect of foster care privatization on the lives of foster children. Public policy related
to underrepresented groups such as foster children is often studied from a purely legislative standpoint without consideration of how the polices may have consequences
that are generally unseen without analysis. If privatization is to remain the goal of
U.S. foster care, it must be improved upon. Foster care is a system that is meant to
keep children from being in unsafe and unhealthy environments. It is up to legislators
deciding how the system will be run to ensure that children are not being moved from
one abusive situation to another.
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APPENDIX
Theoretical Framework
Table 1. Logistic Regression of Abusive
Placement on Demographic Variables
VARIABLES
Female

Abusive Placement
0.209***

Black

(0.00240)
0.0178***

American Indian

(0.00278)
0.0896***

Asian

(0.00806)
0.0368***

Pacific islander

(0.0139)
0.490***

Mixed Race

(0.0260)
0.113***

Unknown Race

(0.00544)
-0.0215***

Age

(0.00426)
0.000131***

Constant

(4.34e-07)
-1.466***
0.00761

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ANALYSIS ONE
Figure 1. Extended Data Breakdown by Privatization
Incidence of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Care (Percentages) - Extended
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Table 2. Extended Multinomial Logit Results by Privatization Level
Model

Hazard Ratio

Ph11sical Abuse
Sexual Abuse
Ne~lect
Parental Alcohol
Abuse
Parental Drug
Abuse
Parental Incarceration
Abandonment
Inadequate Housin~

1.009791
1.006618
1.009544
1.007942

Risk Change

Risk Change

Risk Change

for Small-Scale

for Large-Scale

for Full System

Privatization
.24%
.16%
.23%
.19%

Privatization
.48%
.33%
.47%
.39%

Privatization
.97%
.66%
.95%
.79%

1.009717

.24%

.48%

.97%

1.007197

.17%

.36%

.72%

1.010141
1.00981

.25%
.24%

.51%
.49%

1.01%
.98%

ANALYSIS TWO
Figure 2. Cumulative Hazards of Additional Abuse
and Neglect Indicators by Privatization Level
Risk of Parental Alcohol Abuse Over Time
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Risk of Parental Drug Abuse Over Time
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Risk of Inadequate Housing Over Time
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NOTES

1. The multinomial logit models in analysis one and the cumulative hazard models in analysis
two were conducted including the gender, race, and age controls. There was no substantive
or statistical difference between models run with and without these controls. Akaike and
Bayesian information criterion indicated that the models run without had similar model fit,
but a greater model simplicity. For this reason, the controls were removed for the analysis.
2. These Cox proportional hazards models were also run using a binary variable indicating
whether or not a placement was privatized. The results were substantively and statistically
similar to those seen between system-wide privatizing and systems with no privatization.
The models based on privatization levels were favored because of their indication that
being in a privatized system increases one's risk of privatization, regardless of whether a
specific placement was conducted by a privatized placement company.
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